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Drug Testing of Federal Government
Employees:
Is Harm Resulting From Negligent Record
Maintenance Actionable?
Michael Cicerot
President Reagan signed an executive order in 1986 that requires all executive agencies to establish drug testing programs for
agency employees and job applicants.' Federal regulations require
agencies to retain in employee files the information derived from
testing.2 As more federal employees are tested more frequently, the
potential for abuse in the maintenance and dissemination of employee records increases. Among the dangers to employees posed
by drug testing is the risk of false positives-test results that incorrectly indicate drug use by the person tested.' If an employee
tests positive for a particular drug metabolite, the agency imposing
the test may choose not to act against the employee despite the
seeming evidence of drug use." The false result may nevertheless
become part of the employee's personnel record and may be dist B.A. 1981, University of Notre Dame; M.S. 1984, University of South Carolina; J.D.
Candidate 1989, University of Chicago.
Executive Order 12564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32889 (1986) ("Drug Free Federal Workplace").
In the interest of "achieving the objective of a drug-free workplace," the order directs each
agency head to "establish a program to test for the use of illegal drugs by employees in
sensitive positions," and to "establish a program for voluntary employee drug testing." The
order also authorizes each agency head to conduct mandatory testing of employees under
certain conditions (including reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use) and to test any applicant for employment. Finally, the order precludes the use of test results for gathering evidence against federal employees in criminal proceedings.
2 5 C.F.R. sec. 293.201 et seq.; and 5 C.F.R. sec. 294.101 et seq. ("[elach [executive
department] agency shall establish an Official Personnel Folder for each employee . . .").
' See generally Elaine W. Shoben, Test Defamation in the Workplace, 1988 U. Chi.
Legal F. 181. See also Hugh J. Hansen, Samuel P. Caudill and Joe Boone, Crisis in Drug
Testing, 253 J. A.M.A. 2382 (1985); Comment, Drug Testing and the Unemployment Compensation System, 1988 U. Chi. Legal F. 313; and Alexander Stille, Drug Testing, 8 Nat'l.
L.J. 1 (Apr. 7, 1986).
' An employer may test for reasons other than a desire simply to dismiss its employees
who use drugs. The purpose may be merely to determine the extent of drug use among
employees or to use the test results as a means of identifying employees who should be
supervised with particular scrutiny. Drug testing may also serve a purely deterrent function
for the employer by discouraging drug use among employees. Whether these rationales are
legitimate, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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seminated to third parties, such as prospective employers, with potential resultant harm to the employee's reputation and job
opportunities.
The possibility of false positive results represents only one potential danger to an employee forced to submit to urinalysis.5
Studies have shown that large-scale testing programs may suffer
from sample mislabeling and the confusion of different samples
due to faulty chains of custody. Thus, any duty of care which an
employer owes to maintain accurate personnel records is implicated by the negligent omission or inclusion of information that is
necessary to reflect an employee's employment status accurately.
While many of these problems are immediately generated by those
who administer the tests, the duty of a federal employer in the
chain of events has two aspects. First, the employer is initially responsible for directing that a test be administered. Second, the employer is responsible for the inclusion of any inaccurate test results
in currently maintained and active employment files.
An action for defamation is the immediately apparent remedy
for injury to reputation that is caused by the communication of
inaccurate information in an employee's record.7 But because the
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")8 bars defamation suits against
the government, 9 the claim of a federal employee alleging defama-

' Urinalysis is one of the means by which executive agencies can carry out the mandate
of Executive Order 12564.
' With respect to blood or urine samples, the "chain of custody" denotes the process of
handling a sample from its source to the moment of chemical analysis. The true identity of
a sample may be confused in two ways in the testing process. In the case of urinalysis,
because the subject often produces the sample in private, there is the possibility of substitution of samples. This is sometimes referred to as a "false negative." The more common
problem is that a blood or urine sample will be misidentified at some stage in its handling
between the source and chemical analysis. There is also the danger that the sample will be
adulterated by mixture with foreign substances (or other samples) at some point in its
transportation or storage prior to testing.
' See Clark v. American Broadcasting Company, 684 F.2d 1208, 1212 (6th Cir. 1982),
quoting Nuyen v. Slater, 372 Mich. 654, 662, 127 N.W.2d 369 (1964) ("[a] communication is
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him"); and
Garrett v.Kneass, 482 So.2d 876, 879 (La. App. 1986) ("[language is defamatory when it
... has a tendency to deprive [the plaintiff] of the benefits of public confidence or injure
him in his occupation."). See also W. Page Keeton, ed., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts, sec. 111 (5th ed. 1984) ("Prosser and Keeton"); and American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 559, Comment e (1977). In certain cases, the defamatory nature
of a statement will be presumed by the court and the plaintiff will not need to plead or
prove actual damages in order to recover. See note 38.
8 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346, 2671-80 (1982).
' 28 U.S.C. sec. 2680(h). The FTCA provision which waives governmental immunity,
see note 10, does not apply to "[any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprison-
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tion will fail. The FTCA, however, explicitly authorizes negligence
actions against the government. 10 At least one court has recognized
a remedy for federal employees in the form of an action for negligent maintenance of records.1" Because the two theories of recovery-negligence and defamation-address the same injury, however, other courts have characterized allegations of inaccurate
record maintenance as defamation claims and have barred the ac12
tion under the FTCA.

This Comment examines the utility and availability of a negligent maintenance of records theory to government employees suing
federal agencies for maintaining and disseminating inaccurate employment information. This Comment argues that courts should
recognize that the tort of negligent maintenance of records is often
distinct from the tort of defamation, and concludes that government agencies may be liable for damages if they owe a specific
duty to maintain accurate records. Both the scant legislative history of the FTCA'8 and, more important, strong policy arguments
favor judicial recognition of the negligent maintenance of records
tort. Fundamental tort concepts of proximate causation further

ment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,

deceit or interference with contract rights." Suits alleging "defamation" are synonymous
with suits covered by the "libel" or "slander" exceptions. Jimenez-Nieves v. United States,
682 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1982) ("[t]he Federal Tort Claims Act, however, explicitly exempts
'libel' and 'slander'-what amounts to 'defamation' . . .- from the claims to which the
United States grants consent to be sued"). The acts the government retains immunity for by
Section 2680(h) essentially constitute "intentional torts," meaning that the government actor "desires to cause [the] consequences of his act, or that he believes the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it." Black's Law Dictionary 727 (5th Ed. 1979).
0 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346(b). The provision waives the government's sovereign immunity
against suit for injury
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
The elements of a cause of action sounding in negligence are the existence of a duty,
breach of that duty, a legally attributable causal connection between the negligent conduct
and some injury, and some damage to the plaintiff's legally protected interests. See, for
example, Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International,Inc., 828 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir.
1987) (Texas law); Galanti v. United States, 709 F.2d 706, 708 (11th Cir. 1983) (Georgia
law); and Toscano Lopez v. McDonald's, 193 Cal. App.3d 495, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 447
(1987). Some state tort claims acts are modeled on the federal act. See, for example, 9
Alaska Stat. sec. 50.250 et seq. (1987); Idaho Tort Claims Act, 6 Idaho Code sec. 901 et seq.
(Michie 1988); and Iowa Tort Claims Act, Iowa Code Annot. ch. 25A.1 et seq. (West 1978).
Thus, the discussion herein of the FTCA is analogously applicable to state tort claims acts.
"1 See Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir. 1974), discussed in notes 16,
85-90 and accompanying text.
" See notes 18-19, 21-22 and accompanying text.
" See notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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support such a result. 14
Part I of this Comment analyzes the current legal culture's
treatment of the negligent maintenance of records tort. Part II discusses the FTCA's legislative history and both policy and legal arguments concerning this tort. Finally, Part III explores the source
of the duty by which a government agency may be obligated to
maintain accurate records of drug test results.
I.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT

OF

THE NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE

OF RECORDS TORT

Courts are severely divided over the availability of an action
for negligent maintenance of records. Although the court in
Duenges v. United States 5 rejected an early attempt to sue the
federal government on the theory, the Third Circuit, in Quinones
v. United States," allowed a federal employee to sue the government for negligent maintenance of personnel records. The plaintiff
in Quinones alleged that the government disseminated information
based on incomplete and incorrect records to prospective employers and that as a result he was not hired. The court perceived a
clear distinction between a claim for negligent maintenance of
records and a claim for dissemination of injurious information. The
latter would sound in defamation and thus be barred under the
17
FTCA.
The court in Jimenez-Nieves v. United States 8 took the opposite approach. Alleging that the government mishandled his social security records, the plaintiff contended that his reputation
was later harmed when his checks were not honored. The court
refused to draw a distinction between negligence in the handling of
records and the defamation involved in disseminating the informa-

See notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
, 114 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In Duenges, the plaintiff, who had been honorably
discharged from the Army and later arrested for desertion, alleged that the Government had
negligently maintained his records. The court held that the claim "ar[osel out of false imprisonment and false arrest" as understood in the FTCA and was thus barred. Id. at 752.
"6492 F.2d 1269 (cited in note 11). Barry Quinones was an employee of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs who had compiled a good work record, including
awards and promotions. He alleged that he was denied employment in private industry because his employer made negative statements to prospective employers concerning his fitness and competence which implied that he had been discharged for misconduct. Quinones
sued the government for both failure to make his records available to justifiably interested
persons and failure to maintain "complete, comprehensive, adequate and accurate records"
of his performance. Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1281.
,S 682 F.2d 1 (cited in note 9).
'
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tion. Stating that the plaintiff's claims "resound in the heartland
of the tort of defamation,"1 9 the court held that the action was
barred by the libel and slander exceptions to the Federal Tort
Claims Act.
The approaches represented by Quinones and Jimenez-Nieves
are flatly at odds, as other courts have recognized. 20 Judicial reasoning in accepting or rejecting the theory of negligent maintenance of records is often unsatisfying and rather perfunctory, and
demonstrates a failure to address fundamental issues of tort law
jurisprudence. Some courts simply identify the two strands of decisions and choose one over the other. In Moessmer v. United
States,2 1 for example, a former CIA employee alleged that reliance
on false information in his employment files led CIA officials to
pressure prospective employers not to hire him. The court agreed
with the conclusion of Jimenez-Nieves and dismissed the Quinones argument by stating simply that "we decline to draw such a
distinction in the present case. '"22 Cases such as Moessmer fail to
provide either a satisfactory principle or reasoning that could result in one2 3 that would guide an inquiry into a characterization of
a negligent maintenance of records claim. They also fail to analyze
why a claim should or should not fall within one of the FTCA exceptions. These courts are not alone in their troubles, however.
Courts have been grappling with the scope of the exceptions to the
FTCA since the Act was passed in 1946.24

II. FTCA

PRECLUSION, POLICY, AND COMMON LAW TORT EXcEPTIONS To THE FTCA

Preclusion by one of the excepted torts under the FTCA is the
major hurdle to an action for negligent maintenance of records in
the federal employment context. The term "preclusion" refers to
the superseding of one tort theory by another, where elements of
both are present in the facts and where both theories may be utilized with respect to a similar injury. While pleading in the alter-

"

20
21
22

Id. at 6.
See notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
760 F.2d 236 (8th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 237.

See Ortiz v. County of Hampden, 16 Mass. App. 138, 449 N.E.2d 1227, 1228 (1983)
(recognizing the two lines of cases, the court found itself "persuaded by the reasoning in the
Quinones case that the focus must be upon 'the type of governmental activity that might
cause harm, not upon the type of harm caused' ").
24 See notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
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native is a feature of federal practice2" and is typical at common
law, there are situations where only one of two (or more) possible
theories of relief will be entertained by courts.
Preclusion plays a major role in tort claims acts, such as the
FTCA, which exclude certain types of tort actions against the government.2 The key question involves the characterization of the
tort: Does the action sound in negligence, or does it sound in one of
the excluded torts, thereby precluding the negligence claim?
Courts should therefore make principled and reasoned characterization arguments before proceeding with other issues, such as the
existence of a defendant's duty of care.
A.

The Purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act

The Federal Tort Claims Act,2 7 passed on August 2, 1946,
waives the federal government's sovereign immunity from suit for
injury caused by its own negligent conduct.2 But Section 2680(h)
of the Act exempts several categories of tort from the waiver of
immunity,29 including actions "arising out of" libel, slander, assault, battery, misrepresentation and other intentional torts.3 0
Congress considered means of providing for tort relief against
the United States for three decades prior to the passage of the Act

" Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (e)(2) states that "[a] party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or
in separate counts or defenses."
"' See notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
27 28 U.S.C. sec. 1346, 2671-80 (1982).
28

28 U.S.C. sec. 1346(b):

The district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, . . . for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
2 Some commentators have criticized the existence of the exceptions as ill-justified and
antithetical to the primary purpose of the FTCA. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise, sec. 25.08 at 854 (Supp. 1970) ("[tlhe continued exemption of most deliberate
torts seems clearly a source of injustice"); and Fowler V. Harper and Fleming James, Jr.,
The Law of Torts, Section 29.13 (1956); and Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56
Yale L.J. 534, 547 (1947).
30 The determination whether a particular claim is barred by one of the exclusions,
however, "depends solely upon what Congress meant by the language used." United States
v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 706 (1961). Thus, in an action for negligent maintenance of employment records, for instance, the standard of negligence will be determined by the law of
the state in which the act occurred, but the question of whether the claim will be characterized as negligence or defamation will depend solely upon the FTCA and federal case law.

2391
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in 1946. Before 1946, a person who suffered injury at the hands of
a government employee could attempt to sue the employee privately or petition Congress for a private relief bill." Such petitions
became a significant burden on Congress. Many Congressional representatives argued that such bills did not result in equal application of the law and that Congress' resources were better spent elsewhere. Congress also had to contend with considerable external
pressure. Legal commentators and several bar associations encouraged Congress to provide a remedy for parties injured by acts
of United States government representatives. 3 ' Thus, the dominant
purposes of the FTCA were to relieve Congress of the burden of
claims for private relief and to remedy the injustices caused by
sovereign immunity to those who had suffered from the wrongful
acts of government representatives. 3
The legislative history of the FTCA is not extremely helpful
for determining the purpose of the exceptions in Section 2680(h). 4
Before a Senate subcommittee Alexander Holtzoff testified that
the excluded torts were "type[s] of torts which would be difficult
to make a defense against, and which are easily exaggerated." 5
There are also references in the legislative materials to three rationales for the exceptions embodied in Section 2680(h): (1) To en-

" Lester S. Jayson, 1 Handling Federal Tort Claims, sec. 51 at 2-5 and 2-6 (1988).
Id. at sec. 60 at 2-67 n. 5 and 6.

32

" Id. at sec. 65.01 at 3-3. The Supreme Court described the background of the FTCA in
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950) ("als the Federal Government expanded its activities its agents caused a multiplying number of remediless wrongs," wrongs
which were "remediless solely because their perpetrator was an officer or employee of the
Government").
14 See Johnson by Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845,
852 n. 5 (2d Cir. 1986) (the
legislative history consists mostly of statements by members of Congress or administration
officials on bills similar to the FTCA, which were not enacted; no legislative committee reports discuss the exceptions); Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 625-26 (2d Cir. 1954)
(legislative history is "meager"); and Collins v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 363, 364 (E.D.
Pa. 1966) (legislative history is not "at all helpful"). The absence of helpful legislative history addressing the FTCA exceptions has been noted by commentators as well. See Walter
Gellhorn and Louis Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1325, 1341 (1954) ("(n]o persuasive reason has ever been advanced for [the willful
torts] having been excluded from the reach of the Tort Claims Act").
" Kenneth Culp Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise, sec. 25.08 at 470 (1958), testimony of Alexander Holtzoff before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. Sec. 2690 at 39 (1940). Professor Davis has called this justification "thoroughly unpersuasive" because negligence actions are neither easier to defend
against nor harder to exaggerate than intentional tort actions. Id. Holtzoff had been assigned several years earlier by Attorney General Mitchell to the task of coordinating the
views of the Government departments concerning a tort claims act. He was instrumental in
drafting earlier versions of what became the FTCA. See Edwin M. Borchard, The Federal
Tort Claims Bill, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 1 n. 2 (1933).
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sure that certain government activities are not disrupted by the
threat of damage suits; (2) to avoid exposing the United States to
liability for excessive or fraudulent claims; and (3) to exclude suits
3
for which there are already adequate remedies. 6
Only the second of the rationales suggested by the legislative
history is relevant to the exclusion of an action for negligent maintenance of records, s7 and it is unconvincing. An employee who can
prove breach of a duty to maintain his personnel records and resultant harm has more than a "fraudulent" claim.
To the extent that Congress wrote the exceptions in the fear
that punitive damage awards for intentional torts could be excessive, that fear is unrelated to the issue of preclusion, regardless of
its merits. In any event, unlike an action sounding in defamation,"8
a plaintiff in a negligence action must prove actual damages to win
a judgment.3 9 As a practical matter, this proof requirement will
serve as a cap on the amount recoverable for injury to reputation.
An even more effective check against surreptitious punitive awards
is the fact that FTCA actions are tried without a jury.4 0
The most persuasive explanation of Section 2680(h), but
which does not appear in the legislative history, is that it repre36 See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 858 (1984); S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong.,.

2d Sess. 33 (1946); Tort Claims, Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 before the House
Judiciary Committee, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1942) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Shea); and Tort Claims Against the United States, Hearings on H.R. 7236 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 22 (1940) (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff).
37 The first rationale concerns the discretionary function exception embodied in 28
U.S.C. sec. 2680(a), the policy behind which is that government officials must not be fearful
of performing inherently discretionary functions. The policy sought to quell rampant fear of
liability that may discourage innovation, and even participation, in government. The third
rationale relates to exceptions such as that in Section 2680(c), which excludes claims arising
with respect to tax assessment, customs duty and the detention of goods by customs officers.
3 Defamatory statements concerning a person with respect to his trade, occupation or
business are slander per se. It is not necessary to prove special damages caused by the injurious character of the words. See, for example, Talbert v. Mauney, 80 N.C. App. 477, 343
S.E.2d 5, 8 (1986) (president of bank published statements that plaintiff forged his letters of
credit and that plaintiff was a drug dealer). Publication of defamatory material is libelous
per se-and actionable without proof of special damages-if it causes injury to one's business, trade, profession or office. Caruso v. Loc. U. No. 690, Int. Bro. of Team., 100 Wash.2d
343, 670 P.2d 240, 245 (1983). See also Keeton, Prosser and Keeton at sec. 112 (cited in note
7).
3' See note 10.
," Because there is no right to sue the government "at common law" and because the
FTCA creates an exception to the common law in this respect, the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial does not apply to actions brought under the Act. Glidden Company v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 572 (1962). Juries but not judges are much more likely to exaggerate
damages awards.
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sents Congress' desire to prevent the Government from being held
vicariously liable for the willful and uncontrollable torts of its employees in cases where the Government has taken no specific and
independent wrongful action, either directly by its officers, or indirectly by regulatory requirements. By allowing government liability
to be based solely on its employment relationship with a tortfeasor,
one ignores the impossibility of the government closely monitoring
every one of its employees, and one exploits the government's position as an attractive "deep-pocket" defendant."1
Under President Reagan's "Drug-Free Federal Workplace" executive order,4 the number of federal employees who may be subject to testing is potentially large. One consequence of allowing an
action for negligent maintenance of records would be an increase in
government exposure to liability. Yet an increase in potential liability would be commensurate with the increased risk of harm to
the employee that results from implementing and expanding drug
testing programs.
However, judicial recognition of an action for negligent maintenance of records need not open the doors to excessive government liability. Most important, the risk of liability should be restricted to instances where government officials breach a clear and
specific duty to maintain sensitive information. This restriction
on liability would effectively contain government liability. The institution of a new, large-scale employee drug testing program
greatly increases the aggregate risk of harm to employees resulting
from the negligent handling of records. But such programs have no
effect, for example, on the risk to society of drug-related wrongful
acts committed by government employees (except, perhaps, to reduce the number of these acts through deterrence of drug use). Accordingly, while the government would be liable for negligent
maintenance of drug-testing results under the reading of Section
2680(h) proposed by this Comment, it does not follow that the gov-

See, for example, Sheridan v. United States, 823 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1987) (Winter, dissenting) ("the government should be held subject to suit in all cases where its alleged
liability is independent of the assailant's employment status-i.e., where a court can isolate
a government duty and source of negligence that is based on something other than the fortuitous circumstances that the government happens to be the assailant's employer"); and
Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 1986) (Murnaghan, concurring) ("the
United States owes no general duty to the public to supervise its employees with care"). See
also Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350, 1356 (10th Cir. 1980) ("to hold the United
States government legally responsible for the act in view of the immunity for liability based
on intentional conduct and considering its lack of moral, legal or factual contribution would
not only be invalid, it would constitute gross injustice").
" See note 1.
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ernment would be liable for negligent supervision of an employee
who commits a wrongful act while under the influence of drugs,
where the government had knowledge resulting from testing of the
employee's drug use. Judicial recognition of an action for negligent
maintenance of records does not open the doors to excessive government liability.
B.

Case Law and FTCA Preclusion

In the absence of a clear and satisfactory legislative record,
courts have had to determine the scope of the intentional tort exceptions listed in the FTCA. The judicial response has varied
widely, with courts principally taking divergent positions on the
scope of the statute's language which bars claims "arising out of"
an excepted tort. 3
In a typical case, an employee whose reputation has been
harmed by release of damaging, incorrect information brings an action against the employer for negligence in the maintenance of that
information. By releasing the information to a third party, however, the employer has committed an act that constitutes an element of an action for defamation. Moreover, the interest in reputation that the employee seeks to vindicate by his or her negligence
action is the same interest vindicated by a defamation action. The
two causes of action depend on a common set of facts. Without the
dissemination of information, the negligent maintenance would not
have caused any injury. Similarly, absent negligent maintenance of
the information, its dissemination would have caused no actionable
harm.
In the early years after the Act's passage, the United States
Supreme Court construed the FTCA liberally in several cases for
the stated purpose of recognizing the remedial purpose of the
Act. 4" More recently, there has been a general tendency to take a
41 "The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to...
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights...." 28 U.S.C. sec. 2680.
44 See Rayonier v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957) ("[tlhere is no justification
for this Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress"); Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955) (noting the statute's "broad and just
purpose," the court asserted that it should not "import immunity back into a statute
designed to limit it"); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 548 (1951) (where
statute contains a sweeping waiver of immunity to suit with well-defined exceptions, doctrine of strict construction should not be used to enlarge the exceptions); and United States
v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 372 (1949) (finding Congressional intent not to bar subrogators claims). But see United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 292 (1957) (refusing to
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stricter view of the Act when construing Section 2680(h). In these
later cases, the Court has construed the "arising out of" language
as a bar to actions that contain any elements of an excepted tort.""
Two competing concerns have given rise to this apparent dichotomy in judicial decisions. Where evidence of negligence as well
as the elements of an excluded claim are present, courts have been
concerned with not allowing a plaintiff to "circumvent" the exception" or to avoid it by artful pleading. 7 On the other hand, courts
have been concerned that the negligent conduct of the government,
which is often an antecedent event to any harm directly caused by
an intervening actor, will go unpunished and therefore
unchecked."'
The Supreme Court broadly construed Section 2680(h) in
Neustadt v. United States, 9 which held that the government was

create another exception for voluntary assignments to "the broad sweep" of the Act).
4' Neustadt, 366 U.S. at 703 (cited in note 30). The classic example of an extremely
formal reading of Section 2680(h) is Moos v. United States, 225 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1955),
where a government surgeon operated on claimant's right leg instead of his left leg. The
court held that the negligence action was barred by the assault and battery exception. But
see Lane v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Va. 1964), where the court on similar
facts refused to follow Moos.
" See, for example, Sheridan v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1243, 1244-45 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) ("[iln determining the applicability of the exclusion, 'a court must look, not to the
theory upon which the plaintiff elects to proceed, but rather to the substance of the claim
which he asserts,' " quoting Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441, 443 (2d Cir. 1976));
and Moffitt v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 34, 37 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) ("[tlhe crucial inquiry
is, not whether the plaintiffs assert their claim in charges of negligence, but whether Congress intended to bar this type of suit, under whatever legal theory brought, by expressly
limiting the waiver of governmental immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act...").
17 Nichols v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 260, 263 (N.D. Miss. 1964) ("it must be said
that the applicability of the jurisdictional exclusion in 28 U.S.C. sec. 2680(h) cannot turn
upon the artistry of the pleader"); and Coffey v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 539, 540 (D.
Conn. 1975) ("a plaintiff cannot overcome the exceptions in Section 2680(h) merely by the
artistry of his pleadings").
" The injustices which may result from too narrow a standard for finding government
liability under the FTCA are apparent from the facts of Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d
1502 (9th Cir. 1986). In Bennett, negligent hiring practices gave rise to the government
employing a teacher who kidnapped, assaulted and raped several schoolchildren. A broad
reading of Section 2680(h) would protect the government from the ramifications of this
clearly negligent conduct in hiring. See also Quinones, 492 F.2d 1269 (cited in note 11)
(government undertook the duty to maintain employment records); Underwood v. United
States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966) (government negligently failed to prevent assault); and
Loritts v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Mass. 1980) (government negligently failed
to provide escorts to a member of female choral group who was assaulted and raped by a
West Point cadet).
,1 366 U.S. 696 (cited in note 30). Commentators have criticized Neustadt for its broad
rejection of the separability of tort theories. One author argues that the decision "breeds
nonliability in contravention of the basic reasons behind the Tort Claims Act." Davis, Administrative Law Treatise at sec. 25.08 at 855 (cited in note 29).
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not liable to a homebuyer who relied on a Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") inspector's inaccurate appraisal of a house. Stating that the homebuyer's claim, although framed in negligence
terms, was one "arising out of" the excluded tort of misrepresentation, the Court held that Section 2680(h) required the dismissal of
the action. 0
In Block v. Neal" a unanimous Court refined the ruling in
Neustadt by holding that where the underlying negligence or
wrongful act constituted an independent cause of action, the
FTCA exceptions might not be applicable even though elements of
the excluded torts were present. In Neal, an officer of the Farmers
Home Administration ("FmHA") supervised and inspected the
construction of the plaintiff's house. Having assumed these two duties to the plaintiff, the officer was negligent in both respects. The
plaintiff relied on negligently prepared inspection reports, only
later to discover that the house had serious construction defects.
The Court held that the plaintiff's action was not barred by the
misrepresentation exception because the "duty to use due care to
ensure that the builder adhere to previously approved plans ... is

distinct from any duty to use due care in communicating information to the respondent.""2
Most recently, the Supreme Court faced the issue of the
breadth of the "arising out of" language in Shearer v. United
States. 3 In Shearer, the mother of a serviceman who had been
kidnapped and murdered by another serviceman while off duty alleged that the Army had negligently failed to exert a reasonably
sufficient control over the killer, and had negligently failed to warn
other persons that the killer was at large while knowing that he
had previously been convicted of manslaughter. The action was
barred by the so-called "Feres doctrine." 54 Four of the eight sitting
"0366 U.S. at 702. See Comment, Negligence-Federal Tort Claims Act, 6 Rut.-Cam. L.
J. 842 (1975), arguing that Neustadt presented a great but not insuperable challenge to the
doctrine of Quinones. The comment argues persuasively that one may distinguish Quinones
from Neustadt because a duty to the plaintiff existed only in the former case. The Supreme
Court subsequently modified its holding in Neustadt, but not in a context in which it explicitly recognized the Quinones theory of negligent records maintenance. See notes 51-52
and accompanying text.
" 460 U.S. 289 (1983).
2 Id. at 297.
53473 U.S. 52 (1985).
" Id. at 57. The "Feres doctrine" derives from United States v. Feres, 340 U.S. 135
(cited in note 33), and holds that the FTCA is inapplicable to claims based on injuries
suffered by military personnel as a result of the negligence of other armed services
personnel.
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Justices5 5 took the occasion, however, to argue that the "arising out
of' language of Section 2680(h) is broad enough to encompass any
action in which the facts, though stating a case for negligence, also
support an action based on an excluded tort. The Justices declared
*that the Section 2680(h) exceptions could not be avoided by a "semantical recasting of events" to frame an assault and battery complaint in terms of negligence."
The view in Shearer by the four justices of the Section
2680(h) intentional tort exceptions is too rigid and superficial to be
convincing. Unfortunately, its formalism has spread to lower courts
considering similar issues. For instance, in Johnson by Johnson v.
United States,5 7 the court stated that to allow negligence claims
based on prior foreseeability of harm "would defeat Congress's
purpose in enacting Section 2680(h)" because such claims would be
for injuries caused by an excluded tort.5 8 The reasoning in Johnson
by Johnson unjustifiably characterizes the lack of legislative history as consistent with its holding;" but the case does not explain
why Congress would have wanted the language in Section 2680(h)
to be construed so broadly that it swallows up the operative provisions of the FTCA and thus allows the government to escape liability for its negligent acts. Several courts and individual judges have
refused to accept Shearer's broad acceptance of preclusion.0
In any event, the opinion expressed in Shearer concerning
Section 2680(h) is in tension with the Court's prior holding in
Neal, if not with the letter then certainly with the spirit.6 ' In addi-

Burger, White, Rehnquist and O'Connor.
Shearer,473 U.S. at 55.
" 788 F.2d 845 (cited in note 34).
58 Id. at 851.
69 Id. at 852-53 ("[tlhe meager legislative history available is consistent with the interpretation that Section 2680(h) cannot be avoided merely by alleging that an assault and
battery was due to negligent supervision ....No report or congressional statement suggests
otherwise").
"0See Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1503 (cited in note 48) ("without depending on the views
expressed in Shearer" court held that action for negligence was not barred by the FTCA
assault and battery exception); and Morrill v. United States, 821 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1987)
(three judge panel issued a per curiam decision noting that "this court has twice before
declined to accept the statement of four members of the Shearer court as controlling" and
court held that the assault and battery exception did not preclude imposition of liability on
the government for its supervisory negligence).
" In an attempt to find consistency, several courts have interpreted Neal to permit a
Shearer result which bars a broad range of negligence actions. See Johnson by Johnson, 788
F.2d at 851 (cited in note 34); and Krejci v. U.S. Army Material Dev. Readiness Command,
733 F.2d 1278, 1282 (7th Cir. 1984). According to these cases, Neal allowed a separate action
for negligence only where the negligent act was an independent tort, producing its own injury, no element of which was caused by an excluded tort. In other words, if the negligence
56
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tion, because the view in Shearer was accepted by only four justices and lower courts have interpreted the view divergently,
Shearer cannot be considered controlling on the Section 2680(h)
preclusion issue.
C.

Proximate Causation And Common Law Tort Jurisprudence

1. The Causal Chain From Negligence to Injury. The Shearer
court's expansive reading of the "arising out of" language of Section 2680(h) assumes that the FTCA was drafted by Congress to
recognize and allow only those actions against the government
which are directly caused by the claimed injury. For example,
under the Shearer view, if a plaintiff is assaulted by a government
agent or employee, then Section 2680(h) bars an action against the
government, even if the government was negligent in allowing the
circumstances to arise which occasioned the attack, because the
government did not directly cause the assault and battery tort.
The Shearer analysis, however, contradicts fundamental principles of tort law because the common law of tort considers a broad
temporal range of events when determining the cause of an alleged
injury. Determining whether a party's negligence is actionable
turns on notions of proximate cause, a well-established if still
somewhat confused area of tort law. 2 Thus, courts will hold a negligent actor at fault for damage resulting from the actor's negligence despite an intervening act or event which may have occurred
between the initial negligence and the ultimate injury. A defendant
may be liable for negligence if he could have foreseen the possibility of an intervening act occurring. 3
The broad interpretation of Section 2680(h) by many courts"'
is incorrect because it requires a negligence claim determination to
turn on the nature of the intervening act rather than the act's ef-

would have produced injury in the absence of the elements of an excluded tort, it would be
actionable, despite the presence of an action constituting one of the excluded torts.
" See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1735 (1985); William
L. Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1953); and Laurence H. Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121 (1937).
3 See, for example, Larson Mach., Inc., v. Wallace, 268 Ark. 192, 600 S.W.2d 1, 9
(1980) (if an injury is a natural or probable consequence of the original negligent act and is
such as might reasonably have been foreseen, then an intervening cause is not sufficient to
relieve the original actor of liability); and Sosa v. Coleman, 646 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1981)
(under Florida law, "where the intervening act is itself probable or foreseeable, [the] causal
connection is not broken," between the initial negligence and the ultimate injury). See also
Keeton, Prosser and Keeton at sec. 44 (cited in note 7); and ALI, Restatement (Second) of
Torts at sec. 449 (cited in note 7).
"' See cases cited in notes 46-47.
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fect on causation. 5 Such a formal and mechanical approach does
not distinguish between acts of governmental negligence that proximately cause injury and those that do not.
A decision by the federal district court of Alaska explains the
impropriety of relying on the type of intervening act rather than
its substantive effect on causation for a determination of liability.
In DeLong v. United States,66 civilian workers were allegedly
struck and kicked by Marine guards on a restricted area of a military installation. The plaintiff maintained that military personnel
were negligent in failing to notify the guards of the civilians' right
to be in the area. Distinguishing the case from those in which "the
separate and independent acts of the intentional tortfeasor were
intervening forces of such magnitude as to minimize or sever the
connection between the government's alleged negligence and the
resulting injury, ' 67 the court held that this negligence action was
separate from and not precluded by an action for assault and battery. Under the circumstances, stated the court, "the attack was
not an intervening act and the tort did not arise out of the assault
and battery. It had its roots in the Government's negligence." 6 8
Of course, courts are not constrained by common law tort notions in construing the provisions of the FTCA. But one must presume that Congress was aware of the basic tools of legal analysis
used by courts when it enacted the FTCA with its provision creating governmental liability for negligent acts and certain omissions
of government employees.6 9 This is especially important given the
dearth of FTCA legislative history concerning preclusion. It is not
clear from either the "arising out of" language of Section 2680(h)
or the scant legislative history that Congress intended to override
accepted concepts of proximate cause in determining whether or
not a cause of action would lie in negligence. In these circumstances, ignoring many years of common law development makes
little sense, particularly because the Shearer7 0 view is substantively
unpersuasive.

66 That is, these courts hold that if an intervening act is an element of a tort excluded

by Section 2680(h), then they will bar a negligence action.
" 600 F. Supp. 331 (D. Alaska 1984).
'
Id. at 337.
Id. at 338, quoting Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1395-96 (3d Cir. 1972)
(suit permitted for failure to exercise due care for safety of Job Corps instructors where
trainee attacked instructor).
69 As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "We may presume 'that our elected
representatives, like other citizens, know the law.'" Director, OWCP v. Perini North River
Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 319 (1983), quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
696-97 (1979).
7o 473 U.S. 52 (cited in note 53). See note 53-65 and accompanying text.
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2. Comparing the Acts of Non-Government Employees.
Shearer's view of Section 2680(h) leads to an anomaly when one
considers the government's responsibility for wrongful acts of those
not employed by the government. If an individual not employed by
the government acquired access to negligently maintained government files and disseminated them in a defamatory manner, it is
unlikely that a plaintiff's action against the government would be
barred. Similarly, if a non-government employee commits an assault on government property, the FTCA exception for assault and
act of
battery will not protect the government from liability for an
71
negligence which was a contributing cause of the assault.
Such a view leads to a curious result: A preclusion determination under Section 2680(h) would turn not on the substantive issue
of the government's culpability but on the employment status of a
tortfeasor. If a tortfeasor were a government employee, the action
would be barred; if he were not, the action would stand. Such an
anomalous and inequitable result stands as another reason that the
tendency to preclude tort actions under Section 2680(h) without
explaining substantive issues of proximate cause, as represented by
the Shearer view, should be rejected.7 2
3. Distinguishing Defamation from Assault and Battery.
Much legal development concerning the FTCA exceptions has
taken place in assault and battery cases. The intentional tort of
assault and battery is listed as an exception to the FTCA, and the
FTCA therefore shields the government from liability for assault
and battery. However, there are strong reasons to hold the government liable whenever its negligent record keeping leads to defamation of an employee.

See, for example, Panella, 216 F.2d at 624 (cited in note 34). The court in Panella
explained the rationale for treating tort actions differently in this context, stating that if a
party who commits an assault is an employee of the government, then in the absence of the
Section 2680(h) exception, the assault would give rise to an action against the government
without any showing of negligence. But if a person who commits an assault is not a government employee, no assault action would lie against the government, even if there were a
showing of negligence. Because Section 2680(h) was intended to prohibit claims which could
have been prosecuted in the absence of the exception, the court argued the implication is
that Section 2680(h) bars suit where the person committing an assault is a government employee but does not bar suit if he is not a government employee.
72 Many courts and commentators have criticized this inequitable result. See Note, Section 2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 69 Geo. L.J. 803 (1981) (arguing for a "duty/
causation" approach rather than an "employee/non-employee" approach to the FTCA assault and battery exceptions). See also Judge Winters' dissent in Sheridan, 823 F.2d 820
(cited in note 41) (a well-reasoned critique of courts' tendency to focus on employment status in FTCA cases involving assault and battery).
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Both defamation and assault and battery are intentional torts.
Both torts also involve an intervening actor who is the immediate
cause of harm. In the case of assault and battery, however, the actor commits a prohibited act that is intended to inflict injury
which is often severe. It is arguable that the government, notwithstanding its negligence, should not bear full liability for the harm
resulting from such a willful and prohibited act. Although the government can control its negligence, and thereby control the commission of such offenses, the severity of the assault is largely in the
hands of the intervening actor. Because the severity of the offense
has a direct relationship to the extent of any damages, one can
argue that the government should not bear such liability in assault
and battery cases.73
In contrast, where the government improperly maintains
records leading to defamation of an employee, the intervening actor disseminates the information concerning the employee. Generally, this is done pursuant to a fixed and established procedure.74
Unlike assault and battery, dissemination of employee record information is often not a legally prohibited activity, and the intervening actor is usually not motivated by an intent to do harm to
the employee's reputation. Where agencies routinely disseminate
information from employee records, any defamation that occurs is
"intentional" in only the most formal sense. It is rarely deliberate
and premeditated. Thus, in the typical case, the government's negligence in maintaining records directly determines the severity of
the harm that results from any subsequent dissemination of the
information contained in the records. The extent of damage to the
employee's reputation is not likely to be caused by any willful deliberation of the intervening actor. Because there is more control
by the government over the extent of the potential damage, there
is less reason to insulate the government from liability than in an
assault and battery action.

7' See, for example, Naisbitt, 611 F.2d 1350 (cited in note 41), where two servicemen so
deliberately and wilfully committed a series of assaults, rapes and murders that the court
discounted as a causal factor any governmental negligence in failing to supervise them.
71 One such established procedure is invoked when a government agency makes employee information available to prospective employers. See Quinones, 492 F.2d at 1277
(cited in note 11) (federal administrative regulations govern the disclosure of information
from personnel records to the prospective employer of a government employee).
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EXERCISE CARE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF RECORDS

Given the framework described above, a "negligent maintenance of records" theory should usually not be precluded by Section 2680(h) of the FTCA. A necessary element of an action for
negligence is the existence of a duty of care running from the defendant to the plaintiff.7 5 Any successful action against the government for mishandling personnel records requires that the government have owed the plaintiff a duty of care in the maintenance of
the records. Because the "law of the place" applies to substantive
matters in FTCA litigation, 76 the existence of a duty must be determined according to applicable state law.
There is no universal test for the existence of a duty.17 It is
''an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection. '78 Among the many factors courts often consider to determine whether a duty exists are the foreseeability by the alleged
wrongdoer of harm to the plaintiff, the existence of a statute or
regulation which may create a duty and the gratuitous undertaking
of a service by the alleged wrongdoer.79
Pursuant to President Reagan's executive order mandating a
71

Prosser and Keeton at sec. 30 (cited in note 7).

"0See note 10 and accompanying text.
7
As is argued in Prosser and Keeton "[t]he statement that there is or is not a duty
begs the essential question-whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection
against the defendant's conduct." Prosser and Keeton at sec. 53 (cited in note 7). See also,
Prosser, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 62).
78 Keeton, Prosser and Keeton at sec. 53 at 358.
70 The notion that the government "voluntar[ily] assumfes] ... a duty by affirmative
conduct" is popular in litigation involving government defendants. See Quinones, 492 F.2d
at 1278 (cited in note 11) (in action for negligent maintenance of records, "the employer
would be required to confront the doctrine that one who gratuitously assumes to render a
service obligates himself to proceed with due care"). See also Loritts, 489 F. Supp. at 1031
(cited in note 48) (the government "voluntarily undertook the task of providing escorts to
the choral group of which plaintiff was a member. Having assumed that responsibility, the
[government] is held to performance with due care"); and Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 69
(cited in note 44) ("[tlhe [government] need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once
it exercised its discretion to operate a light . . . and engendered reliance on the guidance
afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was
kept in good working order [and, if not,] to use due care to discover this first and to repair
the light or give warning that it was not functioning").
Whether the theory of assumption of duty works in the case of government recordkeeping is questionable. The government keeps personnel records for its own benefit and is
not primarily concerned with the reliance of others upon the records. In any event, the
stronger theory for the existence of a duty to maintain records is based on the existence of
extensive administrative regulations, which suggests that the government should foresee
harm that may result from negligent record keeping.

239]

NEGLIGENT RECORD MAINTENANCE

"Drug-Free Federal Workplace,""0 several executive agencies have
proposed guidelines for the maintenance and safeguarding of
records that result from federal drug testing programs. These proposed guidelines "include a number of information collection and
record keeping requirements which would be imposed on laboratories wishing to become certified to perform drug testing on
[f]ederal employees." 81 Other provisions severely restrict the categories of "routine use" disclosures that may be made of "records
arising from drug testing of applicants and employees under E. 0.
"
[Executive Order] 12564. 82
Courts may use administrative regulations to establish the existence of a duty of care,83 and judges generally adopt the requirements of a regulation as a standard of care when the regulation's
purpose is to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff
alleging harm. 84 The regulations passed pursuant to Executive Order 12564 were designed to protect the class of persons to whom
drug tests were administered from harm that might result when
the test results are mismanaged or disclosed without proper authority. Thus, a court may find that the Government has a duty to
maintain such records with due care and that injury resulting from
breach of this duty gives rise to an action for negligent maintenance of records.

o See note 1.
Department of Health and Human Services, Scientific and Technical Guidelines for
Federal Drug Testing Programs, 52 Fed. Reg. 30638, 30638 (1987).
82 Office of Personnel Management, Privacy Act of 1974, 52 Fed. Reg. 22564, 22564
(1987).
83 See, for example, Delta Air Lines v. United States, 561 F.2d 381, 394 (1st Cir. 1977)
(violation of an administrative regulation is either negligence per se or evidence of negligence); and Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 1970) (federal regulations
may impose duties and standards of conduct on actors in suit under the FTCA). See also
ALI, Restatement (Second) of Torts at sec. 285 (cited in note 7). But mere compliance with
an administrative regulation, by itself, will not establish the exercise of due care. Wolford v.
General Cable Company, 58 F.R.D. 583, 586 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
84 See Dyer v.United States, 832 F.2d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[niegligence per se
liability is founded upon violation of a statute or safety regulation, which raises a rebuttable
presumption of negligence if the violation results in injury to a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the legislation, and the harm is the kind the regulation was
intended to prevent"); and Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 32 (N.D. Cal. .1981)
("[v]iolation of [a] statute or regulation is evidence of negligence or may create a presumption of negligence"). See also ALI, Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 286 ("The court may
adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to
protect the particular interest which is invaded, and (c) to protect that interest against the
kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to protect that interest against the particular
hazard from which the harm results").
83
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In an analogous situation, the court in Quinones v. United
States found a governmental duty to maintain accurate personnel
records within federal filekeeping regulations. 5 The regulations require the creation of a personnel file for each employee and set
forth guidelines for the maintenance and dissemination of information contained in the files. The Quinones court reasoned that because these agency regulations contemplated dissemination of the
information in employees' files and consequently imposed safeguards, one could presume that the government also foresaw the
potential risk to employees' reputations this information
presented. The court therefore found a corresponding duty to use
reasonable care in maintaining the accuracy of the records."0
Courts use their discretion in locating a duty of care in the
maintenance of records based upon administrative regulations and
guidelines.8 7 The courts that have rejected the theory of negligent
maintenance have done so generally in FTCA cases by finding the
action barred under Section 2680(h), rather than by explicitly rejecting the existence of a duty to maintain records. 8
In a non-FTCA case, Prouty v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.,89 the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that his employer,
Amtrak, owed a duty of care in the maintenance of his records. It
distinguished Quinones by noting that Quinones relied on the
presence of federal regulations, while in Prouty the "plaintiff ha[d]
not indicated that Amtrak was charged with any specific duty to
maintain employment records, imposed by statute or law."90
As government agencies test more of their employees for drug
" 492 F.2d at 1276-77 (cited in note 11).
"6See also Bulkin v. Western Kraft East, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 437, 443 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(holding that "a cause of action exists for 'negligent maintenance of employment records,' "
citing Quinones). With respect to FTCA cases, although the duty may be based on federal
regulations, the claim must state a cause of action for negligence under state law to be
successful.
87 A court may decide to use a statute or regulation to establish a standard against
which negligence may be measured, even where the statute or regulation is silent on the
issue of civil liability. See El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 312 (Tex. 1987); and
Nehring v. LaCounte, 712 P.2d 1329, 1333-34 (Mont. 1986). See also ALI, Restatement 2d
of Torts at sec. 286, Comment d (cited in note 7) ("the court is free ... to adopt and apply
to the negligence action the standard of conduct provided by ... a criminal enactment or
regulation"). Compare the notion of violation of government regulations as negligence per
se. Sheridan, 823 F.2d at 826-27 (cited in note 41) (Winter, dissenting) (basing defendant's
standard of care on government regulations).
88 See Jimenez-Nieves, 682 F.2d 1 (cited in note 9); Moessmer, 760 F.2d 236 (cited in
note 21); and Duenges, 114 F. Supp. 751 (cited in note 15). See the discussion of preclusion
at notes 25-26, 43-56 and accompanying text.
" 572 F. Supp. 200 (D.D.C. 1983).
90 Id. at 206.
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use more frequently, information in employee files will grow significantly. By testing for information that will necessarily intrude
into an employee's private life and by the very personal nature of
most drug tests themselves, the government's ability to monitor its
employees has increased. It is entirely appropriate for the law of
torts to take account of the shift in federal employer-employee relations by offering protection against the possible abuses of private
information. "[A]s our ideas of human relations change, the law as
to duties changes with them."91
IV.

CONCLUSION

Drug testing programs are being instituted in many Executive
Branch agencies. The information maintained on employees is
more extensive than before, and the potential for harm is great because of governmental access to and generation of such information. Where a federal employee suffers reputational injury or loses
employment opportunities because of the release of incorrect or incomplete information contained in his employment records, he
should be able to attempt to recover damages from the government
by an action for negligent maintenance of records.
A court may deny recovery on two grounds. The court may
find a negligence action precluded by the existence of an excluded
tort listed under the FTCA, or the court may find no governmental
duty to maintain records. Although the existence of a duty to
maintain records is generally not difficult to demonstrate, especially where there are government regulations which acknowledge
the existence of a potential for harm, preclusion by the FTCA
raises a more difficult issue. Many courts, following Supreme Court
language in Shearer, suggest a strict, formal approach to Government liability under the FTCA and have been unreceptive to
claims alleging Government negligence where elements of a related
intentional tort are present. Other courts have resigted this excessively formalistic approach, deciding cases with a view to the remedial purposes of the FTCA.
In federal employee suits brought under the FTCA, negligence
in the maintenance of employment records should be treated as an
actionable claim, independent of any defamation that may result
from the negligence, where the employee alleges breach of a specific duty. Mere characterization of a harm as an intentional tort
should not be permitted to consume a plaintiff's substantive claim
" Prosser, 52 Mich. L. Rev. at 12-15 (cited in note 62).
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concerning government wrongdoing. Allowing an action for negligent maintenance of records is consistent both with Congress' apparent purposes in creating Section 2680(h) and with sound policy.
Barring such actions allows the Government to escape liability for
its negligent and wrongful acts, which is contrary to the fundamental premises underlying the FTCA's enactment.

